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Abstract
We investigate the eﬀects of bank distress on the productivity of borrowing ﬁrms
by using data on listed companies in the Japanese manufacturing industry during the
1990s. We ﬁnd some evidence suggesting that deterioration in the ﬁnancial health of
banks, such as a decline in the capital-asset ratio, decreased the productivity of their
borrowers during the period of the severe ﬁnancial crisis (FY1997—1999). Although
large nonperforming loans had posed a serious problem in the Japanese economy
since the collapse of the asset prices bubble in 1991, the resolution of the problem
was postponed during the early 1990s. The Japanese economy plunged into a serious
banking crisis from 1997 to 1999. Our ﬁnding empirically conﬁrms the common view
that a banking crisis negatively aﬀects the productivity of the corporate sector.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper attempts to empirically show the eﬀects of bank distress on the productivity
of borrowing ﬁrms by using data on listed companies in the Japanese manufacturing
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1industry during the 1990s. Many empirical studies conclude that deterioration in the
ﬁnancial health of Japanese banks had adverse eﬀects on the investment of their borrow-
ers during the 1990s (Gibson, 1995, 1997; Kang and Stulz, 2000; Nagahata and Sekine,
2005; Fukuda et al., 2005a, 2005b).
Meanwhile, there is little agreement as to whether the productivity of ﬁrms was
aﬀected by the deterioration in the ﬁnancial health of banks. Ogawa (2007) reports
that nonperforming loans at banks had no eﬀects on ﬁrms’ investments in research and
development that were closely related to the productivity growth of ﬁrms. In contrast,
Fukuda et al. (2007) report that the productivity of ﬁrms declined when unhealthy banks
increased the provision of long-term loans to the ﬁrms. These previous studies encounter
common diﬃculties in dealing with the endogeneity problem of the ﬁnancial health of
banks: The health of banks was likely to be aﬀected by the productivity of ﬁrms. Our
study, which solves the endogeneity problem by using valid instruments for bank health,
sheds light on the unexplored relationship between the ﬁnancial health of banks and the
productivity of their borrowers.1
Our study is closely related to the studies on the causes of the long stagnation in the
Japanese economy during the 1990s. Many researchers argue that a prolonged decline
in the total factor productivity (TFP) grow t hr e s u l t e di nt h ee c o n o m i cs l o w d o w na f t e r
the collapse of the asset price bubble (Hayashi and Prescott, 2002; Kobayashi and Inaba,
2005).2 The decline in the TFP growth may be partly attributed to the distress in the
banking sector. This paper attempts to examine whether the bank distress caused the
1Some studies examine the eﬀects of bank distress on the (expected) proﬁtability of the borrowers
using the event study framework. These studies investigate the changes in the stock prices of borrowing
ﬁrms surrounding the day of an event such as the announcement of bank failure. Slovin et al. (1993)
examine the case of the failure of the Continental Illinois Bank, while Yamori and Murakami (1999),
Kang and Stulz (2000), and Miyajima and Yafeh (2003) examine the cases of bank distress in Japan
during the 1990s. Our study is diﬀerent from these studies in that we directly estimate the changes in
the productivity of borrowers when the ﬁnancial health of banks deteriorated.
2Kawamoto (2004) points out that there is no evidence of a decline in the true technological progress
for the Japanese economy during the 1990s when he controls for capital utilization and reallocation of
inputs.
2decline in the productivity in the Japanese economy during the 1990s.
We ﬁnd that a decline in the capital-asset ratio of a bank decreased the productivity
of the borrowers during the severe ﬁnancial crisis (FY1997—1999). Some researchers point
out that a credit crunch occurred during this period (Woo, 2003; Watanabe, 2005). Our
ﬁnding suggests that a banking crisis has adverse eﬀects on the productivity of ﬁrms
through a credit crunch. See Section 6 for more details.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy describe Japan’s banking
crisis during the 1990s. Section 3 presents the methodology of our empirical study.
Section 4 presents our ﬁnding that a deterioration in the ﬁnancial conditions of banks,
such as a decline in the capital-asset ratio, decreased the productivity of their borrowers.
Section 5 presents the robustness checks of our results. Section 6 discusses the causes of
the decline in productivity. Section 7 presents the conclusion.
2 Banking Crisis in Japan
In this section, we present an overview of the banking crisis in Japan.3 The Japanese
banks aggressively increased their lending to real estate-related industries in the late
1980s, when land prices soared. However, the collapse of the land price boom in 1991
turned many of the real estate-related loans into nonperforming ones. The Japanese
banks, anticipating the quick recovery of land prices, postponed the writing oﬀ of the
nonperforming loans and supported their distressed borrowers. Contrary to their expec-
tation, the land prices consistently fell during the 1990s. As a result, huge loan losses
negatively aﬀected the ﬁnancial health of the banks. The bank distress culminated in a
widespread liquidity crisis in late 1997.4
In November 1997, the bankruptcy of Sanyo Securities resulted in the ﬁrst postwar
default in the interbank market. The default precipitated the sharp contraction of the
interbank market, and many ﬁnancial institutions suﬀered the liquidity crunch. Two
3See Miyajima and Yafeh (2003) for a detailed chronology of the banking crisis in Japan.
4Hoshi and Kashyap (2001: 276—280) provide a detailed description of the banking crisis in the late
1990s.
3major ﬁnancial institutions, namely, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities,
failed during the liquidity crisis. The turbulence in the banking sector did not end
although the government injected Y =1.8 trillion into 18 major and 3 regional banks in
March 1998. Two major banks, namely, the Long-term Credit Bank and Nippon Credit
Bank, failed in late 1998. The government once again injected Y =7.5 trillion into 15
major banks in March 1999. Finally, the banking crisis ended in early 2000 because of
the recapitalization by the government and the announcement of consolidation among
major banks.
After the crisis, there was steady progress in the consolidation among banks and
the disposal of nonperforming loans. The 10 city banks operating as of early 1997 were
reorganized into ﬁve groups by early 2005. The nonperforming loans of major banks,
which had reached Y =26.8 trillion in March 2002, were reduced to Y =7.4 trillion by March
2005.5 In April 2005, the Japanese ﬁnancial system returned to normal for the ﬁrst time




We study the eﬀects of bank health on the level of the productivity of manufacturing
ﬁrms during the 1990s. Speciﬁcally, we examine the manufacturing ﬁr m sl i s t e do na n y
of the three major stock exchanges in Japan, Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya for FY1993—
FY2002. A ﬁscal year runs from April to March. There were more than 1300 listed
manufacturing ﬁrms during the sample period.
We use the TFP as a measure for the productivity of ﬁrms.6 Following the approach
5The data of nonperforming loans are based on the Financial Reconstruction Law. The data are
available from the Web site of the Financial Services Agency. The Financial Services Agency. “Status of
Non-Performing Loans.” March 15, 2008 <http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/regulated/npl/index.html >
6We calculate the TFP using the index number approach. The Solow residual is included as a special
case of the index number approach. The estimation of the Solow residual usually necessitates strong
4of Good et al. (1999) and Fukao and Kwon (2006), we construct a hypothetical repre-
sentative ﬁrm in the entire manufacturing industry in each year.7 The TFP level of each
ﬁrm in each ﬁscal year is measured relative to that of a hypothetical ﬁrm in FY1990.
The TFP level of a ﬁrm i in year t relative to that of a hypothetical ﬁrm in year 0 (the
base year) is calculated as in the following equation:
















(Sk,s + Sk,s−1)(lnXk,s − lnXk,s−1)(1)
where lnYit is the logarithm of the output of ﬁrm i in year t,S k,it is the cost share of the
input k of ﬁrm i in year t,a n dl nXk,it is the logarithm of the input k of ﬁrm i in year t.
lnYt, Sk,t,a n dlnXk,t denote the averages of lnYit,S k,it,a n dl nXk,it, respectively, across
all the manufacturing ﬁrms in year t. W ea s s u m eah y p o t h e t i c a lm a n u f a c t u r i n gﬁrm
with lnYt, Sk,t,a n dlnXk,t in year t. Thus, in equation (1), the ﬁrst two terms describe
the diﬀerence between ﬁrm i and a hypothetical ﬁrm in year t while the last two terms
chain together the hypothetical ﬁrms back to the base year. The output of a ﬁrm is the
total sales. The inputs of a ﬁrm are intermediate input, labor, and capital.8 The changes
in working hours and capital utilization can aﬀect the estimation of the productivity of
ﬁrms. Unfortunately, we cannot obtain the ﬁrm-level data on working hours and capital
utilization. We partially control for the eﬀects of these factors by using the sector-level
assumptions such as marginal cost pricing and constant returns. See Bartelsman and Doms (2000) for
details.
7We classify the manufacturing industry into 17 sectors. However, we do not construct a represen-
tative ﬁrm for each sector to compare the productivity of ﬁrms in the diﬀerent sectors. The 17 sectors
consist of foods, textile products, wooden products, pulp and paper products, publication and printing,
chemical products, petroleum reﬁnery, rubber products, ceramic, stone and clay products, iron and steel,
non-ferrous metals, metal products, general machinery, electrical machinery, transportation equipment,
precision instruments, and miscellaneous manufacturing products.
8In calculating the TFP, our sample excludes those observations for which the data on the cost share
of inputs are unavailable. We also exclude the observations for which the capital-labor ratio has a value
that is in the top or the bottom 1 percent in the total observations during FY1990—2002.
5data.
We focus on the relationship between ﬁrms and their main banks because many
researchers argue that main banks play a special role in the case of Japanese ﬁrms (Aoki
and Patrick, 1994). However, identifying a main bank for each ﬁrm is not an easy task,
because there is no rigid deﬁnition of a main bank. Following Gibson (1995) and Hori
et al. (2004), we identify a main bank for each ﬁrm by using Kaisha Shikiho (Japan
Company Handbook), published by Toyo Keizai.9 The book reports the list of banks
that each ﬁrm deals with. The ﬁrst bank in the list is identiﬁed as the main bank for the
ﬁrm. If a governmental ﬁnancial institution is the ﬁrst bank in the list, the second bank
is identiﬁed as the main bank. For example, 17 major banks and 35 regional banks were
identiﬁed as main banks as of FY1997.
We use three alternative measures to evaluate the health of a main bank: (1) the
capital-asset ratio in terms of market value (MCAR), (2) the Bank for International
Settlement (BIS) capital-asset ratio (BCAR), and (3) the diﬀerence between the two
measures of the capital-asset ratio (GAP). The MCAR is derived by dividing market
capitalization by the same risk-weighted assets as the BCAR. To obtain market capital-
ization, we obtain the product of the number of outstanding shares of each bank and
the share price at the end of the ﬁscal year. The GAP is calculated by subtracting the
BCAR from the MCAR.
The BCAR has been widely used in the previous studies as a measure of bank health.
For example, Peek and Rosengren (2005) use the deviation of a bank’s reported BIS
capital-asset ratio from the minimum requirement to measure the health of the bank.
However, Woo (2003) and Hosono and Sakuragawa (2005) point out that the BCAR
reported by banks may not accurately reﬂect their condition because banks can easily
manipulate the assessment of nonperforming loans and the provision for loan losses.
Instead, they propose the MCAR as a measure of bank health, assuming that the stock
market can accurately evaluate the asset quality of each bank. Hosono and Sakuragawa
(2005) also ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the MCAR and the reported BCAR aﬀected
9W er e f e rt ot h es u m m e ri s s u eo fKaisha Shikiho for the construction of data.
6the Japanese bank lending during the 1990s. Following their arguments, we also use the
MCAR and GAP as measures of bank health.
The capital-asset ratio of a bank is supposed to decline when the bank health deteri-
orates. Thus, the MCAR, BCAR, and GAP should have positive eﬀects on the produc-
tivity of a ﬁrm if the deterioration in bank health negatively aﬀects the productivity of
the ﬁrm.
Some characteristics of ﬁrms can also aﬀect their productivity. Fukao et al. (2005)
ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms have higher productivity. Moreover, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000)
and Fukao et al. (2005) report that ﬁrms with larger foreign ownership have higher
productivity. Jensen (1986) points out that debt improves ﬁrm eﬃciency by reducing
the agency costs of free cash ﬂows. As the theory predicts, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000)
ﬁnd that ﬁrms relying more on debt ﬁnancing have higher productivity.
In constructing the TFP and other variables for each ﬁrm, we use Kigyo Zaimu Deta
Banku (company ﬁnancial statements data bank), compiled by the Development Bank
of Japan.10 Financial data on banks are obtained from the Nikkei NEEDs database
and the ﬁnancial statements of each banks. The data on the stock prices of each bank
are collected from the Stock Price CD-ROM and Monthly Statistics Report, which are
published by Toyo Keizai and the Tokyo Stock Exchange, respectively. The appendix
provides details about the construction of our data.
3.2 Empirical Model
In order to examine the relationship between bank distress and the productivity of their
borrowers, we focus on the TFP of individual ﬁrms. Speciﬁcally, we test whether the
variables measuring the health of a main bank of a ﬁrm have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the
TFP level of the ﬁrm. We specify the empirical model as follows:




10We use nonconsolidated data of each ﬁrm because it provides detailed information on the investment




θtYEA R t + ηi + εit, (2)
where lnTFPit is the logarithm of the TFP level of ﬁrm i at the end of the ﬁscal year
t.l n T F P it−1 is included as the lagged dependent variable to allow for state dependence.
BANK HEALTHjt is a variable measuring the health of a main bank j for ﬁrm i.W e
use the three alternative measures for BANK HEALTH: the MCAR, BCAR, and GAP.
Xsit−1 is a variable for the characteristics of ﬁrm i that may have eﬀects on the TFP. We
use one-year lagged variables of X to mitigate the endogeneity problem. The variables
X include lnASSETS, FOREIGN, and DEBT. lnASSETS is the logarithm of the book
value of a ﬁrm’s total assets; FOREIGN is the proportion of a ﬁrm’s shares held by
foreigners; and DEBT is the ratio of the book value of a ﬁrm’s debt to the book value of
its total assets. YEARt is a year dummy to control for the aggregate shock common to
all ﬁrms. ηi represents the unobservable ﬁxed eﬀects for ﬁrm i,a n dεit is the error term.
We eliminate the ﬁxed eﬀects ηi by diﬀerencing equation (2), and obtain the following
equation:







θt∆YEA R t + ∆εit. (3)
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation of equation (3) generally results in
inconsistent estimators, because the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the
error term. Following the method suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), we use
lnTFPit−2 as an instrument for ∆lnTFPit−1 in order to estimate equation (3).11
The assumption that BANK HEALTH is an exogenous variable in our empirical
model may be invalid because the productivity of ﬁrms can aﬀect the health of the main
bank. The poor performance of ﬁrms caused by ineﬃcient management may increase
the nonperforming loans of the main bank. An increase in bad loans damages the health
11We also estimate the equation using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) proposed by Arel-
lano and Bond (1991). However, we do not adopt the estimation results because the test of overidentifying
restrictions strongly suggests that some of the instruments are correlated with the error term.
8of the main bank. This simultaneous causality results in biased estimators.12 In order
to solve the endogeneity problem of BANK HEALTH, we need an instrument that is
correlated with ∆ BANK HEALTH but uncorrelated with ∆ε in equation (3).13
Following Watanabe (2005), we focus on the lending behavior of banks in the 1980s.
Speciﬁcally, as the instrument for ∆BANK HEALTH, we use LOAN89–each bank’s
share of lending in FY1989 to real estate-related industries (the real estate, construction,
and ﬁnancial services industries).14 The optimism associated with the boom in land
prices drove banks to aggressively increase their lending to real estate-related industries
in the 1980s. When the boom collapsed and land prices fell sharply in the 1990s, many
of the real estate loans turned into nonperforming ones. Ueda (2000) reports that there
is a clear positive correlation between the nonperforming loan ratio of each bank and the
share of loans to real estate-related industries. Massive losses resulting from the writing
oﬀ of nonperforming loans impaired the banks’ capital. Thus, there should be a negative
correlation between LOAN89 and ∆BANK HEALTH. Meanwhile, there should be no
correlation between LOAN89 and ∆ε because the current productivity of ﬁrms does not
aﬀect the banks’ previous loan portfolio choice.
Equation (3) is estimated in two ways. First, we treat BANK HEALTH as an ex-
ogenous variable. Then, we treat BANK HEALTH as an endogenous variable and use
LOAN89 as the instrument for ∆BANK HEALTH. In the ﬁrst stage, we regress ∆BANK
HEALTH on LOAN89 and the interaction terms between LOAN89 and year dummies
so that we can allow the relationship between ∆BANK HEALTH and LOAN89 to vary
over time.
12Stock and Watson (2006: 324—325) provide a detailed explanation of the simultaneous causality bias.
13As an alternative way to deal with the endogeneity problem, we use a one-year lagged BANK
HEALTH instead of BANK HEALTH. However, we obtain poor results.




F i g u r e1d e p i c t say e a r l yt i m es e r i e so ft h eaverage TFP level of listed manufacturing
ﬁrms. The TFP improved steadily until FY1996 and fell sharply in FY1997, when the
banking crisis occurred. After the brief recovery during FY1998—1999, the TFP fell again
with the advent of the recession of the early 2000s.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the TFP and other variables.15 We deﬁne
the period of FY1997—1999 as the period of banking crisis, taking into account the fact
that the crisis erupted in November 1997 and ended in early 2000. Thus, the sample
period is divided into three periods: FY1993—1996 (the precrisis period), FY1997—1999
(the crisis period), and FY2000—2002 (the postcrisis period).
The increase in the TFP during FY1997—1999 was due to the recovery of the TFP
during FY1998—1999. The decrease in the TFP during FY2000—2002 was due to the
recession. With regard to the measures for bank health, the MCAR and BCAR indi-
cate diﬀerent trends. The MCAR declined sharply throughout the sample period, while
the BCAR remained stable. As a result, the GAP–the diﬀerence between the MCAR
and BCAR–turned from a positive value to a negative one during FY1997—1999. The
negative value of GAP implies that the MCAR was lower as compared to the reported
BCAR. The discrepancy between the two measures for the capital-asset ratio was larger
in FY2000—2002.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
15We exclude aberrant observations from our sample. The aberrant observations are deﬁned as those
for which any one variable in the estimation equation has a value that is in the top or the bottom 1
percent of the total observations during FY1992—2002.
104.2 Basic Results
Table 2 presents the regression results of equation (3). The upper panel of the table
presents the results obtained by treating BANK HEALTH as an exogenous variable,
while the lower panel presents the results obtained by treating it as an endogenous
variable.16 The results of each panel are reported for each of the three observed periods.
The three columns for each period show the results using the three alternative measures
for BANK HEALTH: the MCAR, BCAR, and GAP.
For FY1993—1996, there is no strong relationship between bank health and the level
of productivity of ﬁrms. We ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of MCAR
on the productivity of ﬁrms when we treat it as an endogenous variable. However, the
eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level.
For FY1997—1999, we ﬁnd a strong relationship between bank health and the level
of productivity of ﬁrms. The MCAR and GAP have positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the productivity of ﬁrms regardless of whether or not they are treated as
endogenous variables. The magnitude of the eﬀects is economically meaningful. The
estimated coeﬃcient of MCAR is 0.759 when we treat it as an endogenous variable. This
implies that a rise in the MCAR from 0.06 to 0.12 (about two standard deviations)
induces a rise in the level of productivity by 4.6 percent points. The estimation results
suggest that a ﬁrm whose main bank is in distress has a lower level of productivity.
With regard to the BCAR, we cannot obtain reliable results. In the upper panel, the
eﬀect of BCAR is positive but statistically insigniﬁcant. In the lower panel, the eﬀect of
BCAR is positive and statistically signiﬁcant. However, the J-statistic suggests that the
instruments for the BCAR are not exogenous. As Hosono and Sakuragawa (2005) point
out, the accounting discretion exercised by banks can drive a wedge between the reported
BIS capital-asset ratio and the true ﬁnancial condition of the banks. The discretionary
16The F-statistics for the ﬁrst-stage regression for BANK HEALTH may overstate the relevance of the
instruments because ∆BANK HEALTH may be correlated with the instruments for lagged ∆lnTFP,
and not the instruments for ∆ BANK HEALTH in equation (3). We check this possibility by estimating
the model for which lagged lnTFP is not included in the explanatory variables. Although not reported
here, ∆BANK HEALTH is suﬃciently correlated with its instruments.
11accounting practices of banks may cause the poor estimation results for the BCAR.
For FY2000—2002, we ﬁnd no consistent relationship between bank health and the
level of productivity of ﬁrms. Positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of the MCAR
and GAP on the productivity of ﬁrms are observed in the upper panel but not in the
lower panel. These facts suggest that the regression results in the upper panel suﬀer
from the simultaneous causality bias.
Our regression results indicate that the level of productivity of ﬁrms was aﬀected by
the health of the main bank only during FY1997—1999, when the banking crisis occurred.
Our results suggest that the turmoil in the banking sector had adverse eﬀects on the
manufacturing sector. We discuss this point later.
The results of other variables are qualitatively similar for each period. The coeﬃcient
of lagged lnTFP is positive and highly signiﬁcant.17 The results indicate the strong
state dependence of the productivity of ﬁrms. Unexpectedly, lnASSETS is found to be
negatively related to the productivity of ﬁrms. Our result is in sharp contrast to that
of Fukao et al. (2005). This may be because we use the lagged variable for ﬁrm size,
while Fukao et al. (2005) use the current variable. The coeﬃcient of FOREIGN has
an expected positive sign; however, it is almost statistically insigniﬁcant. DEBT has
a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on the productivity of ﬁrms. The result is
consistent with that of Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2000).
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
5R o b u s t n e s s C h e c k s
In the above section, we obtained the results that deterioration in bank health lowered
the level of productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms only during FY1997—1999. However, the
17The coeﬃcients of lagged lnTFP are close to one for FY1993—1996 and FY1997—1999. Wooldridge
(2002: 304) points out a problem in the estimation when the coeﬃcient of lagged dependent variable
is close to one. We check whether the problem aﬀects the regression results by estimating the model
that assumes the coeﬃcient of lagged lnTFP to be one. Although not reported here, the results are
qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.
12value of BANK HEALTH (the MCAR, BCAR, and GAP) not only changes when the
ﬁnancial condition of the main bank changes but also when the main bank merges with
other banks. The measures for the health of a main bank also changes when a ﬁrm adopts
another bank as its main bank. We verify whether the basic results are aﬀected by bank
mergers among banks or the replacement of main banks by ﬁrms. Table 3 presents the
regression results, excluding the observations for which the main bank merged with other
banks or was replaced by another bank. The table only shows the results treating BANK
HEALTH as an endogenous variable.18 A large decrease in the number of observations
for FY2000—2002 is due to the merger among major banks. The results are similar to
those of the lower panel of Table 2. We can conﬁrm that the basic results are not aﬀected
by bank mergers or replacements of main banks.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
We verify whether the eﬀect of bank health on the productivity of ﬁrm varies accord-
ing to the dependency of the ﬁrm on bank debt. The ﬁrms that depend less on bank
debt are supposed to be less subject to deterioration in bank health. The medians of
bank debt to the total asset ratio for FY1993—1996, FY1997—1999, and FY2000—2002
are 0.134, 0.140, and 0.135, respectively. The ﬁrms with a bank debt to total asset ra-
tio above the median are classiﬁed as bank-dependent ﬁrms, and the remaining, as less
bank-dependent ﬁrms.
Table 4 presents the regression results for bank-dependent ﬁrms and less bank-
dependent ﬁrms. The upper panel of the table presents the results for bank-dependent
ﬁrms, and the lower panel, those for less bank-dependent ones. The results of each panel
are reported for each of the observed periods (FY1993—1996, FY1997—1999, and FY2000—
2002). The three columns for each period show the results using the three alternative
measures for BANK HEALTH.
For FY1997—1999, the MCAR and GAP have positive and statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀects on the level of productivity of ﬁrms for bank-dependent ﬁrms. In contrast, we
18We also implement the regressions treating BANK HEALTH as an exogenous variable. Although
not reported here, the results are basically the same as those reported in the tables below.
13ﬁnd no relationship between bank health and the productivity of ﬁrms for less bank-
dependent ﬁrms. These results are consistent with our expectation that the eﬀect of
bank health has less impact on the productivity of the ﬁrms that rely less on bank debt.
For other periods, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant relationships between bank health
and the productivity of ﬁrms for bank-dependent ﬁrms, and for less bank-dependent
ones.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
We also examine whether the eﬀect of bank health on the productivity of ﬁrms is
aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s access to the capital market. We focus on the frequency of issuance
of bonds by ﬁrms during FY1993—1998.19 As of FY1998, 769 ﬁrms had never issued any
bonds, while 630 ﬁrms had issued bonds at least once during the past six years. The
former are classiﬁed as nonbond issuers, and the latter, as bond issuers.
Table 5 presents the regression results for nonbond issuers and bond issuers. The
upper panel of the table presents the results for nonbond issuers, while the lower panel
presents the results for bond issuers. The results of each panel are reported for each of
the observed periods. The three columns for each period show the results using the three
alternative measures for BANK HEALTH.
For FY1997—1999, we ﬁnd positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationships between
the two measures of bank health–the MCAR and GAP–and the productivity of ﬁrms
for nonbond issuers. We ﬁnd that only the MCAR has a positive and statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects on the productivity of ﬁrms for bond issuers. Further, the eﬀect is statistically
signiﬁcant only at the 10 percent level. These results suggest that the deterioration in
bank health had adverse eﬀects primarily on the ﬁrms for whom access to bond markets
was constrained during FY1997—1999. For FY1993—1996, the MCAR has a positive and
statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on the productivity of ﬁrms for bond issuers but not for
nonbond issuers. The unexpected results may suggest a spurious relationship between
bank health and the productivity of ﬁrms for this period. For FY2000—2002, we ﬁnd no
19Unfortunately, we cannot obtain the data on the issuance of bonds by ﬁrms after FY1999.
14statistically signiﬁcant relationships between bank health and the productivity of ﬁrms
for either nonbond issuers or bond issuers.
We ﬁnd that the eﬀects of bank health on the productivity of ﬁrms are observed for
the ﬁrms that heavily relied on bank debt and the ﬁrms for whom access to the capital
market was constrained. The results are consistent with our interpretation that the
ﬁnancial conditions of banks had serious impacts on the productivity of their borrowers
during FY1997—1999.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the reason that bank health signiﬁcantly aﬀected the produc-
tivity of manufacturing ﬁrms only during FY1997—1999. We argue that a credit crunch
caused by the banking crisis might have aﬀected the productivity of ﬁrms during this
period.
For FY1997—1999, the Japanese economy experienced the most serious banking crisis
in the postwar period. Some researchers point out that a credit crunch occurred during
the banking crisis (Ogawa, 2003; Woo, 2003; Watanabe, 2005). Bernanke and Lown
(1991) deﬁne “a bank credit crunch” as “a signiﬁcant leftward shift in the supply curve for
bank loans, holding constant both the safe real interest rate and the quality of potential
borrowers.”20
Figure 2 presents the “lending attitude of ﬁnancial institutions” diﬀusion index in
Principal Enterprises Tankan (Short-term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) re-
ported by the Bank of Japan (BOJ). The responding ﬁrms are asked to select one of
three alternatives: (1) Accommodative, (2) Not so severe, and (3) Severe. The diﬀusion
index is constructed by subtracting the percentage share of ﬁrms responding “Severe”
20Bernanke and Lown (1991) present the seminal paper on this subject. They argue that the deteri-
oration in the capital of banks caused the unusual slowdown in the lending activity in New England in
the early 1990s.
15from that of ﬁrms responding “Accommodative.” The Principal Enterprises Tankan sur-
veys 373 manufacturing ﬁrms that are basically selected from among listed ﬁrms having
a capital greater than one billion yen.21
The diﬀusion index fell precipitously in December 1997 and took negative values
for the period from March 1998 to June 1999. In September 1999, the diﬀusion index
took a positive value for the ﬁrst time in a year and a half. This suggests that even
large manufacturing ﬁrms experienced a serious credit crunch during the banking crisis,
although they were relatively healthy as compared to ﬁrms in troubled industries such
as the construction and real estate industries.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
Some empirical studies provide further evidence of the occurrence of a credit crunch
during the banking crisis. Woo (2003) examines the lending behavior of the Japanese
banks during FY1990—1997, and ﬁnds a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of bank capital
on the new loan growth in FY1997. He points out that, in FY1997, there occurred
not only severe distress of the ﬁnancial system but also a signiﬁcant strengthening of
bank regulation such as the introduction of the prompt corrective action framework.
He argues that these factors caused the weakly capitalized banks to slow down their
lending. Watanabe (2005) examines the bank lending to the manufacturing industry
during FY1995—2000, and conﬁrms that a positive and signiﬁcant relationship existed
between bank capital and the loan growth in FY1997—1998. These empirical results
support that a credit crunch occurred during the banking crisis.
A credit crunch can have adverse eﬀects on ﬁrm activity. Bernanke and Lown (1991)
argue, “by limiting access to working capital, reduced lending could force ﬁrms to shed
workers and delay investment plans, reducing output in both the short and long run.”
Ogawa (2003) examines the eﬀects of loan supply on ﬁrm investment by using the lending
attitude of ﬁnancial institutions diﬀusion index of the BOJ as a proxy for the supply
condition of loans. He ﬁnds that the supply condition of loans had a signiﬁcant impact
on the investment even for large ﬁrms.
21See the December 2002 survey for details.
16The banking crisis caused the weakly capitalized banks to cut back on lending to
ﬁrms. A sharp decrease in the supply of loans negatively aﬀected the eﬃciency of ﬁrm
management by disrupting production. This is consistent with our ﬁnding that the
positive relationship between bank health and the productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms
was observed only during FY1997—1999.
We also check whether our ﬁnding can be explained by the evergreening behavior of
banks. As Peek and Rosengren (2005) point out, unhealthy banks have an incentive to
continue or increase lending to troubled and ineﬃcient ﬁrms in order to conceal their
problem loans. Such forbearance lending could lead to a positive relationship between
bank health and the productivity of ﬁrms. However, many empirical studies report that
Japanese banks were engaged in forbearance lending to nonmanufacturing ﬁrms rather
than manufacturing ﬁrms (Sekine et al., 2003; Caballero et al., 2006). Moreover, the
evergreening behavior of banks was observed throughout the 1990s, which is inconsistent
with our ﬁnding that bank health had an eﬀect on the productivity of ﬁrms only during
FY1997—1999. These facts do not support the hypothesis that the evergreening behavior
of banks caused a decline in the productivity of manufacturing ﬁrms during FY1997—
1999.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We analyze how deterioration in bank health during the 1990s aﬀected the productivity
of ﬁrms, using data on listed companies in the Japanese manufacturing industry. We
ﬁnd some evidence suggesting that deterioration in the main bank health caused a de-
crease in the productivity of the borrowers in FY1997—1999. Moreover, the relationship
between main bank health and the productivity of ﬁrms is observed more clearly in bank-
dependent ﬁrms. However, we cannot ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between main bank
health and the productivity of ﬁrms either in FY1994—1996 or FY2000—2002.
It is a widely accepted that a credit crunch during a banking crisis should lowers
the productivity of borrowing ﬁrms; however, this is not empirically conﬁrmed in the
existing literature. Our ﬁndings on manufacturing ﬁrms in Japan provide a supporting
17evidence for this view.
Data Appendix
TFP
In calculating the TFP level of a ﬁrm, we use the total sales [K2820] as the output.22 The
total sales of each ﬁrm are deﬂated by the BOJ’s output price index for each sector. The
inputs of a ﬁrm consist of intermediate input, labor, and capital. The intermediate input
is obtained by subtracting the sum of the wages [K4050 + K5750] and depreciation
[K6800] from the sum of the cost of sales [K2840] and sales administrative expense
[K2970]. The intermediate input of each ﬁrm is deﬂated by the BOJ’s input price index
for each sector. The labor input is obtained as the product of the number of employees
[K0440] and hours worked per employee. The data on the working hours for each sector
are available from the Monthly Labour Survey by the Ministry of Health, Labour, and
Welfare.
Capital stock for a ﬁrm is deﬁned as the sum of the six categories of tangible ﬁxed
assets: (1) buildings, (2) structures, (3) machinery, (4) ships, (5) autos/trucks, and (6)
tools/ﬁxtures.23 First, we estimate the book value of investment in each category of
the tangible ﬁxed assets, taking into account the sold or retired assets. The book value
of investment in each category of tangible ﬁxed assets during year t (NIt)i se x p r e s s e d
as NIt = ∆TAt − (ASRt − ADSRt), where ∆TA is an increase in the tangible ﬁxed
assets [K6270, K6280, K6290, K6300, K6310, K6320], ASR is the acquisition value of
sold or retired assets, and ADSR is the book value of accumulated depreciation for sold
or retired assets.24 We then deﬂate the book value of investment in each category of
22K**** denotes an item number in Kigyo Zaimu Deta Banku (company ﬁnancial statements data
bank).
23We refer to Hori et al. (2004) and Tanaka (2004) in constructing the data on capital stock for each
ﬁrm.
24ASRt is calculated as ASRt = At−1 −At +∆TA t, where A is the acquisition value of assets [K6410,
K6420, K6430, K6440, K6450, K6460]. ADSRt is calculated as ADSRt = ADt−1 −ADt +DEPt,w h e r e
AD is the book value of the accumulated depreciation for assets [K6530, K6540, K6550, K6560, K6570,
18tangible ﬁxed assets by the BOJ’s corporate goods price index.
The real value of each category of the tangible ﬁxed assets in year t (Kt) is calculated
by the perpetual inventory method as follows: Kt =( 1−δ)Kt−1 +It, where I is the real
value of investment in the tangible ﬁxed assets, and δ is the depreciation rate. Following
Hayashi and Inoue (1991), we set δ as 0.047 for buildings, 0.0564 for structures, 0.09489
for machinery, 0.1470 for ships, 0.1470 for autos/trucks, and 0.08838 for tools/ﬁxtures.
We select FY1977 as the base year when the real value of the tangible assets is assumed
to be equal to the book value. Thus, the initial value of K for ﬁrms listed before FY1977
is set at the book value in FY1977, while that for ﬁrms listed after FY1977 is set at the
book value in the ﬁscal year when the ﬁrms were listed.
Capital input is obtained as the product of the capital stock and capital utilization
index. The data on capital utilization index for each sector are available from the JIP
Database 2006 of the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
We calculate the cost shares of the three inputs: intermediate input, labor, and
capital. The intermediate input cost is obtained by subtracting the sum of wages [K4050
+ K5750] and depreciation [K6800] from the sum of the cost of sales [K2840] and sales
administrative expense [K2970]. The labor cost is deﬁned as wages [K4050 + K5750].
The capital cost is deﬁned as the sum of the capital cost of the six categories of tangible
ﬁxed assets. The capital cost of each category of tangible ﬁx e da s s e t si ny e a rt (Costt)
is expressed as follows: Costt = qt(rt + δ)Kt, where q is the price of the tangible ﬁxed
assets, r is the interest rate, δ is the depreciation rate, and K is the real value of the
tangible ﬁxed assets. The data on the price of the tangible ﬁxed assets are obtained
from the BOJ’s corporate goods price index. The data on interest rates are obtained
from the “Yields to Subscribers and Issue Terms of Interest-bearing Government Bonds”
compiled by the BOJ.
K6580], and DEP is the accounting depreciation [K6630, K6640, K6650, K6660, K6670, K6680].
19Other Variables for Firm Characteristics
The data on ASSETS are obtained from the book value of the total assets [K1880]. The
data on FOREIGN are obtained from the proportion of a ﬁrm’s shares held by foreigners
[K0200]. For DEBT, we divide the outstanding amount of debts, bonds, and commercial
papers [K1960 + K1990 + K2000 + K2250 + K2300 + K2350] by the book value of
the total assets [K1880]. The bank debt to total asset ratio is derived by dividing the
outstanding amount of debts [K1960 + K2000 + K2350] by the book value of the total
assets [K1880]. For the frequency of issuance of bonds, we refer to the amount of bond
issuance [K6830, K6870, K6910].
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25Table 1. Descriptive statistics (mean)
FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
Variables for firm characteristics
TFP (FY1990=1) 0.989 0.991 0.984
(0.078) (0.067) (0.063)
lnASSETS 17.722 17.690 17.699
(1.320) (1.310) (1.322)
FOREIGN 0.053 0.052 0.055
(0.076) (0.078) (0.090)
DEBT 0.252 0.244 0.223
(0.165) (0.177) (0.174)
Variables for bank characteristics
(BANK HEALTH)
MCAR 0.127 0.089 0.048
(0.039) (0.032) (0.028)
BCAR 0.092 0.107 0.105
(0.006) (0.012) (0.009)
GAP 0.035 -0.018 -0.057
(0.038) (0.033) (0.026)
Obs 4635 3368 3339
The table presents the mean values for the variables in our empirical model. Standard deviations 
are in the parentheses. TFP is the total factor productivity for a firm. The TFP level for a firm 
in a fiscal year is measured relative to that for a hypothetical firm in FY1990, which is defined 
to be one. lnASSETS is the logarithm of the book value of a firm's total assets. FOREIGN is 
the proportion of a firm's shares held by foreigners. DEBT is the ratio of the book value of a 
firm's debt to the book value of its total assets. MCAR is the capital-asset-ratio of a main bank 
for a firm in terms of market value. BCAR is the Basel capital-asset-ratio of a main bank for 
a firm. GAP is MCAR minus BCAR.Table 2. Basic rgression results 
Results treating BANK HEALTH (MCAR, BCAR, and GAP) as exogenous
Dependent variable: lnTFP FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
MCAR -0.072 0.246 *** 0.165 **
(0.047) (0.076) (0.075)
BCAR 0.230 0.217 -0.301 **
(0.170) (0.144) (0.123)
GAP -0.096 ** 0.130 ** 0.143 ***
(0.045) (0.062) (0.048)
lagged lnTFP 0.985 *** 0.973 *** 0.968 *** 0.869 *** 0.951 *** 0.863 *** 0.501 *** 0.526 *** 0.495 ***
(0.057) (0.054) (0.057) (0.074) (0.079) (0.074) (0.061) (0.064) (0.060)
lnASSETS -0.103 *** -0.104 *** -0.102 *** -0.129 *** -0.146 *** -0.128 *** -0.065 *** -0.067 *** -0.065 ***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
FOREIGN 0.048 0.048 0.046 0.104 0.065 0.099 0.019 0.001 0.018
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
DEBT 0.145 *** 0.151 *** 0.145 *** 0.214 *** 0.232 *** 0.213 *** 0.148 *** 0.153 *** 0.146 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)
F-statistics (lagged lnTFP) 380.37 *** 409.61 *** 375.08 *** 319.64 *** 309.15 *** 320.63 *** 274.56 *** 258.10 *** 273.80 ***
Obs 3410 3503 3321 2243 2236 2245 2224 2113 2223
Results treating BANK HEALTH (MCAR, BCAR, and GAP) as endogenous
Dependent variable: lnTFP FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
MCAR 0.374 * 0.759 *** -0.194
(0.210) (0.228) (0.324)
BCAR -1.044 0.931 ** 1.810
(1.047) (0.425) (1.835)
GAP 0.293 0.566 *** -0.185
(0.399) (0.194) (0.295)
lagged lnTFP 0.951 *** 0.979 *** 0.937 *** 0.893 *** 0.944 *** 0.876 *** 0.535 *** 0.584 *** 0.542 ***
(0.057) (0.055) (0.060) (0.075) (0.079) (0.074) (0.067) (0.085) (0.074)
lnASSETS -0.099 *** -0.106 *** -0.099 *** -0.134 *** -0.144 *** -0.131 *** -0.067 *** -0.073 *** -0.069 ***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013)
FOREIGN 0.042 0.044 0.041 0.120 * 0.072 0.106 0.021 0.003 0.024
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.051) (0.056) (0.052)
DEBT 0.147 *** 0.154 *** 0.145 *** 0.215 *** 0.231 *** 0.212 *** 0.154 *** 0.162 *** 0.153 ***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.029) (0.027)
F-statistics (lagged lnTFP) 95.63 *** 102.13 *** 94.74 *** 110.93 *** 106.55 *** 110.91 *** 94.01 *** 86.82 *** 94.00 ***
F-statistics (BANK HEALTH) 47.55 *** 14.84 *** 8.41 *** 95.66 *** 89.42 *** 47.47 *** 12.52 *** 4.46 *** 12.20 ***
J-statisitics 1.68 4.00 3.28 0.09 12.88 *** 1.66 1.23 0.65 1.20
Obs 3410 3503 3321 2243 2236 2245 2224 2113 2223
The upper panel of the table presents the results of the IV estimation treating BANK HEALTH as exogenous. The lower panel presents the results of the GMM estimation treating BANK HEALTH as endogenous.
Refer to the footnote of Table 1 about the definitions of the regression variables. The Results for year dummies are not reported here. The F-statistics (an endogenous variable) presents the result of the F-test for   
the instruments in the first-stage regression for the endogenous variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.Table 3. Rgression results excluding observations with mergers or switches of main banks (Treating BANK HEALTH as endogenous)
Results treating BANK HEALTH (MCAR, BCAR, and GAP) as endogenous
Dependent variable: lnTFP FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
MCAR 0.249 0.740 *** -0.043
(0.183) (0.229) (0.226)
BCAR -1.259 0.630 1.458
(1.039) (0.415) (1.982)
GAP 0.073 0.564 *** -0.040
(0.286) (0.194) (0.216)
lagged lnTFP 0.958 *** 0.983 *** 0.951 *** 0.884 *** 0.938 *** 0.870 *** 0.421 *** 0.450 *** 0.422 ***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.061) (0.074) (0.078) (0.073) (0.071) (0.075) (0.073)
lnASSETS -0.100 *** -0.107 *** -0.100 *** -0.132 *** -0.145 *** -0.130 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 *** -0.066 ***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
FOREIGN 0.069 * 0.065 * 0.065 * 0.113 * 0.065 0.100 -0.007 -0.034 -0.006
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067) (0.057) (0.061) (0.058)
DEBT 0.150 *** 0.159 *** 0.148 *** 0.212 *** 0.229 *** 0.208 *** 0.166 *** 0.161 *** 0.166 ***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028)
F-statistics (lagged lnTFP) 87.99 *** 94.48 *** 87.00 *** 109.02 *** 104.61 *** 109.02 *** 67.47 *** 62.16 *** 67.47 ***
F-statistics (BANK HEALTH) 51.66 *** 15.10 *** 14.17 *** 97.75 *** 87.65 *** 46.87 *** 13.52 *** 2.48 * 13.23 ***
J-statisitics 2.90 3.30 3.65 0.00 12.54 *** 1.10 0.97 0.60 0.97
Obs 3257 3345 3167 2228 2213 2228 1546 1468 1546
The table presents the results of the GMM estimation treating BANK HEALTH as endogenous. We exclude the observations for which the main bank merged with other banks or was switched to another bank.
Refer to the footnote of Table 1 about the definitions of the regression variables. The Results for year dummies are not reported here. The F-statistics (an endogenous variable) presents the result of the F-test 
for the instruments in the first-stage regression for the endogenous variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.Table 4. Rgression results for bank-dependent firms and less bank-dependent firms (Treating BANK HEALTH as endogenous)
Results for bank-dependent firms
Dependent variable: lnTFP FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
MCAR 0.572 0.656 ** -1.113
(0.365) (0.334) (1.073)
BCAR -0.955 0.429 2.157
(1.407) (0.652) (2.470)
GAP 0.163 0.733 ** -0.732
(0.492) (0.323) (0.717)
lagged lnTFP 0.940 *** 1.003 *** 0.943 *** 1.012 *** 1.061 *** 1.011 *** 0.642 *** 0.575 *** 0.636 ***
(0.091) (0.088) (0.092) (0.100) (0.108) (0.101) (0.161) (0.121) (0.162)
lnASSETS -0.054 *** -0.059 *** -0.051 *** -0.117 *** -0.121 *** -0.120 *** -0.056 *** -0.064 *** -0.061 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)
FOREIGN -0.041 -0.039 -0.048 0.219 0.092 0.190 0.110 0.024 0.088
(0.058) (0.063) (0.059) (0.135) (0.131) (0.138) (0.119) (0.104) (0.110)
DEBT 0.204 *** 0.217 *** 0.200 *** 0.287 *** 0.304 *** 0.289 *** 0.170 *** 0.150 *** 0.159 ***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.048) (0.040) (0.044)
F-statistics (lagged lnTFP) 53.01 *** 58.37 *** 52.76 *** 57.35 *** 54.64 *** 57.27 *** 54.27 *** 49.08 *** 54.21 ***
F-statistics (BANK HEALTH) 24.66 *** 5.82 *** 3.29 ** 49.34 *** 38.77 *** 21.09 *** 9.81 *** 2.48 *** 10.37 ***
J-statisitics 0.75 2.69 2.66 2.32 7.25 *** 0.85 0.60 1.41 0.89
Obs 1675 1730 1616 1135 1124 1137 1112 1053 1111
Results for less bank-dependent firms
Dependent variable: lnTFP FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
MCAR 0.111 0.374 0.111
(0.257) (0.278) (0.308)
BCAR -0.569 0.998 0.162
(1.201) (0.638) (1.532)
GAP 0.037 0.208 0.095
(0.384) (0.207) (0.295)
lagged lnTFP 0.990 *** 0.987 *** 0.985 *** 0.863 *** 0.950 *** 0.852 *** 0.538 *** 0.558 *** 0.537 ***
(0.075) (0.073) (0.077) (0.122) (0.131) (0.121) (0.092) (0.094) (0.093)
lnASSETS -0.151 *** -0.152 *** -0.150 *** -0.178 *** -0.206 *** -0.178 *** -0.087 *** -0.085 *** -0.087 ***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
FOREIGN 0.089 * 0.084 * 0.090 * 0.072 0.072 0.071 0.012 -0.010 0.010
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.068) (0.071) (0.068) (0.060) (0.063) (0.060)
DEBT 0.132 *** 0.131 *** 0.133 *** 0.229 *** 0.261 *** 0.232 *** 0.178 *** 0.170 *** 0.178 ***
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.052) (0.053) (0.051) (0.041) (0.044) (0.042)
F-statistics (lagged lnTFP) 49.94 *** 51.89 *** 49.59 *** 48.92 *** 45.60 *** 48.92 *** 42.45 *** 39.89 *** 42.45 ***
F-statistics (BANK HEALTH) 16.58 *** 10.76 *** 6.30 *** 39.45 *** 50.35 *** 29.58 *** 6.17 *** 4.17 *** 6.00 ***
J-statisitics 1.09 2.00 1.14 2.90 * 3.87 ** 3.59 * 0.28 0.49 0.31
Obs 1735 1773 1705 1108 1112 1108 1112 1060 1112
The table presents the results of the GMM estimation treating BANK HEALTH as endogenous. The upper panel of the table presents the results for bank-dependent firms while the lower panel for less bank-dependent 
ones. Refer to the footnote of Table 1 about the definitions of the regression variables. The Results for year dummies are not reported here. The F-statistics (an endogenous variable) presents the result of the F-test for
the instruments in the first-stage regression for the endogenous variable. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance level of 1, 5, and 10%, respectively.Table 5. Rgression results for nonbond issures and bond issures (Treating BANK HEALTH as endogenous)
Results for nonbond issures 
Dependent variable: lnTFP FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
MCAR -0.022 0.763 ** -0.103
(0.286) (0.315) (0.367)
BCAR -2.793 0.709 0.883
(2.488) (0.582) (2.241)
GAP -0.558 0.707 ** -0.093
(0.462) (0.298) (0.338)
lagged lnTFP 0.892 *** 0.907 *** 0.906 *** 0.890 *** 0.965 *** 0.876 *** 0.489 *** 0.531 *** 0.490 ***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.083) (0.102) (0.105) (0.103) (0.095) (0.109) (0.097)
lnASSETS -0.106 *** -0.109 *** -0.107 *** -0.109 *** -0.116 *** -0.107 *** -0.075 *** -0.084 *** -0.076 ***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.016) (0.019) (0.016)
FOREIGN 0.122 ** 0.123 ** 0.134 ** 0.223 ** 0.083 0.233 ** 0.164 ** 0.146 0.168 *
(0.052) (0.055) (0.056) (0.103) (0.103) (0.105) (0.083) (0.089) (0.088)
DEBT 0.125 *** 0.147 *** 0.128 *** 0.217 *** 0.218 *** 0.213 *** 0.120 *** 0.130 *** 0.120 ***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.036)
F-statistics (lagged lnTFP) 58.04 *** 63.79 *** 57.53 *** 54.46 *** 54.83 *** 54.52 *** 52.79 *** 49.17 *** 52.79 ***
F-statistics (BANK HEALTH) 27.90 *** 6.71 *** 5.32 *** 50.43 *** 38.74 *** 21.32 *** 6.26 *** 1.71 5.44 ***
J-statisitics 3.69 1.07 1.24 0.53 7.37 *** 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.02
Obs 1751 1809 1698 1201 1187 1202 1206 1148 1206
Results for bond issures
Dependent variable: lnTFP FY1993-1996 FY1997-1999 FY2000-2002
MCAR 0.751 ** 0.528 * -0.395
(0.304) (0.312) (0.613)
BCAR 0.711 0.834 2.784
(0.967) (0.633) (2.399)
GAP 1.238 0.327 -0.402
(0.761) (0.231) (0.534)
lagged lnTFP 1.031 *** 1.094 *** 0.960 *** 0.931 *** 0.957 *** 0.919 *** 0.603 *** 0.639 *** 0.632 ***
(0.083) (0.083) (0.102) (0.111) (0.119) (0.111) (0.090) (0.117) (0.114)
lnASSETS -0.098 *** -0.102 *** -0.090 *** -0.172 *** -0.191 *** -0.171 *** -0.061 *** -0.057 ** -0.064 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.020) (0.023) (0.021)
FOREIGN -0.006 -0.016 0.013 0.052 0.084 0.039 -0.070 -0.089 -0.072
(0.056) (0.054) (0.062) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.069) (0.078) (0.071)
DEBT 0.163 *** 0.154 *** 0.159 *** 0.236 *** 0.267 *** 0.237 *** 0.188 *** 0.191 *** 0.189 ***
(0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.037) (0.043) (0.039)
F-statistics (lagged lnTFP) 41.47 *** 42.73 *** 40.94 *** 60.87 *** 53.62 *** 60.92 *** 43.29 *** 39.95 *** 43.28 ***
F-statistics (BANK HEALTH) 17.82 *** 16.48 *** 4.16 *** 44.55 *** 52.99 *** 32.29 *** 6.86 *** 3.69 ** 8.16 ***
J-statisitics 1.42 6.78 ** 2.56 0.74 5.44 ** 1.40 1.41 0.38 1.19
Obs 1659 1694 1623 1042 1049 1043 1018 965 1017
The table presents the results of the GMM estimation treating BANK HEALTH as endogenous. The upper panel of the table presents the results for nonbond issuers while the lower panel for bond issuers. Refer 
to the footnote of Table 1 about the definitions of the regression variables. The Results for year dummies are not reported here. The F-statistics (an endogenous variable) presents the result of the F-test for the 
































)Figure 2. Diffusion index of lending attitude of financial institutions 
for listed manufacturing firms
The diffusion index is constructed by subtracting the percentage share of firms responding ``Severe'' from that of firms 
responding ``Accommodative''.
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